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Abstract
The paper examines the relationship between household income and schooling
costs in the presence of intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological chil-
dren. To this end, we construct a two-period model of intrahousehold schooling
bias. The model predicts that there is an asymmetry in the impact of changes
in costs and income on schooling in the sense that the impact is larger for the
non-biological child. It predicts that the asymmetry increases as the relationship
distance between the non-biological child and the parents gets wider. It also shows
that an increase in cost of schooling leads to a bigger reduction in schooling for
poor households, and that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes between the
biological and the non-biological child declines as household income increases i.e.
there is convergence. And the convergence is faster the more distantly related to the
parents the non-biological child is. An empirical investigation of these predictions
using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data, shows that
when current enrolment and grade attainment are used to measure schooling, the
price and income elasticities of schooling are larger for non-biological children. The
results also indicate that households in the lowest income quintile (the poorest)
have the largest price elasticities, and households in the highest income quintile
(the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. We also nd that the price
elasticities for biological and non-biological children converge as we move from the
lowest income quintile to the highest income quintile, and that the convergence is
faster for non-biological children who are non-relatives.
1 Introduction
Parents as primary care givers of children play an important role in the formation of
human capital which is vital for the economic development of any country. They do this
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by investing in the health and the education of their children. The role of parents in
providing for the education of both their own o¤ spring as well as non-biological children
in developing countries especially sub-Saharan African countries is more critical now given
the impact of HIV/AIDS. An estimated 1.7 million people were infected with HIV in
2007, bringing to 22.5 million the total number of people living with the virus in sub-
Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2007). This entails more orphans in the future who have to
be educated by extended family or non-relatives. A number of studies nd evidence of
schooling bias against non-biological children within households in sub-Saharan Africa,
suggesting that parents discriminate against non-biological children who stay with them.
Case et al. (2004), using 19 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets from 10
African countries, nd that orphans are less likely to be enrolled than nonorphans with
whom they live. Gundersen et al. (2004) and Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu (2007) nd
a similar result for Zimbabwe and Kenya respectively. Shapiro and Tambashewe (2001)
nd that children living in households headed by someone other than their father or
mother tend to have somewhat lower educational attainment in the Democratic Republic
of Congo. They nd this to be more evident for the ages 10141.
Thus, while there is a plethora of economic studies which show evidence of discrimina-
tion against non-biological children, the literature is scanty on the possible sources of
this discrimination. For example, Case et al. (2004) show that the probability of school
enrollment is inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the house-
hold head, regardless of whether the child is an orphan or not. There has been an almost
exclusive focus on gender bias by studies which attempt to o¤er sources of intrahouse-
hold bias in schooling (e.g. Behrman et al. 1986; Davies and Zhang 1995; Alderman and
Gertler 1997; Alderman and King 1998; Echevarria and Merlo 1999; Rose 2000; Pasqua
2005). In addition to the paucity of economic studies on sources of schooling bias against
non-biological children, to the best of our knowledge there is no study which addresses
the issue of what happens to schooling bias following household income and cost changes.
The contributions of the study are threefold. Firstly, the study proposes a theoretical
model which o¤ers possible sources of schooling bias against non-biological children. The
second contribution of the study is that it theoretically demostrates in the presence of
discrimination, how households respond to changes in household income and school costs,
and how the households response to cost changes varies with household income. The nal
contribution of the study is that it empirically investigates the theoretical predictions.
Specically, the empirical analysis seeks to examine using Malawian data, how house-
holds respond to changes in household income and school costs, and how a households
response to cost changes varies with household income. The theoretical and empirical
1While in a number of countries there is evidence of schooling bias, in others households exhibit
no discrimination. For example, Zimmerman (2003) nds that South African households treat foster
children as they do their own children in terms of human capital investment.
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analyses conducted by the study are signicant. They not only contribute specically
to the understanding of schooling bias against non-biological children, but they also add
to the available literature on intrahousehold schooling bias in general. Knowledge of
the factors which cause intrahousehold schooling bias as well as how schooling changes
as household income and school cost change, and how a households response to cost
changes varies with household income would no doubt go a long way in the formulation
of strategies to ght schooling bias at the household level. More crucially, this knowledge
takes on an added signicance in the light of the increasing number of orphans due to
HIV/AIDS in sub Saharan Africa who mostly end up living with extended family and
other non-relatives2.
To understand why there may be schooling bias against a non-biological child in a house-
hold, we construct a two period model of the family in which parents work in the rst
period and retire in the second period. In the rst period, they allocate their income be-
tween consumption and investment in the schooling of a biological child and non-biological
child. In the second period, parents consume from the income transfers that the two chil-
dren make when they are adults. The income transfered depends on the schooling invested
in the two children in the rst period. Thus, there are both investment and consumption
motives to educating the children. The two children are assumed to be of the same sex.
The model predicts two broad sources of schooling bias against a non-biological child, one
attributable to non-preference based conditions, and the other due to a pure preference
bias by parents. In terms of discrimination coming from the non-preference based condi-
tions, the model shows that there will be schooling bias against a non-bioligical child if
the cost (direct and opportunity costs) of educating the non-biological child are higher;
if the returns to education of the non-biological child are lower; and if the subjective
belief about how much will be transferred by the own child when the parents retire is
higher compared to the non-biological childs. Further to that, the model predicts that
the schooling gap between the biological child and the non-biological child gets wider
as the relationship distance between the non-biological child and the parents gets wider.
The model also predicts schooling bias arising from preference bias, where parents get
more utility from the income of their own child.
The model shows that the impact of a change in costs and income on the amount of
schooling investment is bigger for the non-biological child. That is, an increase in the
cost (income) leads to a larger reduction (increase) in schooling of the non-biological child
relative to the biological child. This suggests that households respond asymmetrically to
changes in costs and household income. The model further predicts that the gap between
the two children following these changes gets wider the more distantly related the non-
2In 2005, the estimated adult (age 15-49) HIV prevalence rate for Malawi was 14.1%. With this
prevalence rate, Malawi was ranked number eight in the world (UNAIDS 2006).
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biological child is. The model also shows that the change in schooling due to a change
in costs falls with income, and falls faster for the non-biological child who is distantly
related to the parents. This suggests that an increase in cost of schooling leads to a
bigger reduction in schooling for poor households, and that the di¤erence in the impact
of cost changes between the biological and the non-biological child declines as household
economic status improves i.e. there is convergence.
Using blended households in Malawi, that is households with both biological and non-
biological children of school going age, and measuring schooling either as current enrol-
ment or as grade attainment, the empirical results conrm the theoretical predictions.
Specically, we nd that when both measures of schooling are used the price and in-
come elasticities of schooling are larger for non-biological children. Further, we nd that
non-biological children who are non-relatives have higher price and income elasticities.
The empirical analysis also indicates that households in the lowest income quintile (the
poorest) have the largest price elasticities, and households in the highest income quintile
(the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. The study also nds that the price
elasticities for biological and non-biological children converge as we move from the lowest
income quintile to the highest income quintile, and that the convergence is faster for
non-biological children who are non-relatives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of intrahousehold
schooling discrimination and discusses its implications as well as conducts comparative
static exercises. In Section 3 we discuss the hypotheses to be tested, the econometric
model used, variables used, estimation issues, and data and descriptives. Econometric
results are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 A model of intrahousehold schooling bias
We adapt a model structure used by Alderman and Gertler (1997), and Alderman and
King (1998), to study gender schooling bias in households. Consider a society in which
parents live in two periods, indexed by t = 1; 2 respectively. They work in the rst period,
and retire in the second period. In the rst period, they give birth to a child (b), and in the
same period they have a non-biological (nb) child moving into the family3. Throughout,
we use subscripts j = b; nb to refer to the two children. The children (biological and
non-biological child) are of the same sex4, and approximately of the same age5. The
parentsconsumption in the rst period is their income less the investment on schooling
3For simplicity, we assume that the movement of a non-bilogical child into the family is exogenous.
4This allows us to focus on schooling di¤erences in the household which are not due to gender bias.
5This allows us control for the childrens future level of earnings.
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of the two children6. In the second period (during retirement), their consumption depends
on the income transfered by the two children, which in turn depends on the schooling
investment that the parents made in the rst period. Thus, parentsdecision to educate
children is done both for its own sake as a consumption good, and as an investment good.
This entails that there are both investment and consumption reasons for investing in
the education of the two children. There is a trade o¤ between current consumption and
second period consumption, in that less consumption in period 1, means more schooling
for the children, and hence more consumption during retirement. We assume that there
are no savings, and no old age pension. We also assume that only parents are responsible
for the schooling of the children in the rst period, that is there are no private or public
scholarships. We assume that there is complete and perfect information meaning that
there is no uncertainty7.
The life time utility function of parents is given as follows;
U = G(C1) + V (W2b;W2nb; C2) (1)
Where; C1 is their rst period consumption, C2 is their second period consumption,
W2b is the income of their child in period 2 (retirement period), W2nb the income of
the non-biological child in period 2 (retirement period), and  is the discount rate or
subjective rate of time preference. This utility function says that parents get utility from
consumption in the two periods, and also they get utility from the income of the two
children in the second period. We assume that the utility function is twice continuously
di¤erentiable and has the following conventional properties;
G0 > 0; V 0 > 0 (2)
G00 < 0; V 00 < 0
Thus, the utility functions are concave meaning that utility is increasing but diminishing.
Since we have assumed that there are no pensions and savings, parentssecond period
consumption is given as;
C2 = kW2b + kW2nb (3)
6For simplicity, we dont allow for overlapping generations in which the parentsalso transfer part of
their income to their parents.
7One could also allow for parental uncertainty in the transfers that the children would make when
they are adults.
5
That is, the resources available for consumption by parents in retirement come from the
transfers that the two children make when they are adults. The parents have a subjective
belief k, about how much of each childs income will be transferred to them when they
retire. Where k 2 [0; 1], and k is a measure of the degree of relatedness of the child.
For a biological child k = 1, and for a non-biological child k > 1: A higher k denotes
a more distantly related non-biological child. For ease of exposition, we assume that k
takes positive integer values. There are a number of reasons why transfers may be made
by children when they are adults to their retired parents. As argued by Cigno (1993),
there may exist in a society a social norm according to which adults give a fraction of
their income to their old parents. The workings of the social norm are aptly explained
by López-Calva and Miyamoto (2004, p 491) when the say;
"The adult has to decide on whether to transfer money to her retired par-
ents or not. An informal intergenerational contract exists, which can only be
enforced through "social punishment." The social perception of the adults de-
cision shall determine the optimal reaction of her own child and thus whether
she herself is going to get a transfer when retired."
Even in the absence of the said social norm, the non-availability of pension schemes
in poor countries entail that old people rely on the resources received from their adult
children (Pasqua 2005)8.
The two childrens income when they are adults is;
W2b = bS1b + Ib (4)
and
W2nb = nbS1nb + Inb (5)
where bS1b (nbS1nb) is the biological (non-biological) childs labour income, and Ib
(Inb) is the own (non-biological) childs non-labour income. The labour income for the
biological child is a linear function of the level of schooling (S1b) invested by the parents
in period 1. Similarly, the labour income for the non-biological child is a linear function
of the level of schooling (S1nb) invested by the parents in period 1. And b and nb are
the returns to education for the biological and non-biological child respectively. Though
the innate ability of each child might also a¤ect his/her earnings, for simplicity it not
included9.
8We assume here that the subjective belief is exogenous.
9Apart from investing in schooling, the parents may also indirectly a¤ect the earnings potential of
the two children through other child specic inputs such health and nutrition. We do not model this
indirect channel.
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In period 1, the parents face the following budget constraint;
C1 + P1bS1b + P1nbS1nb = Y (6)
where P1b and P1nb are indirect and direct costs of schooling of the biological and non-
biological child respectively, and Y is parental labour and non-labour income. We normal-
ize the price of consumption to one. The budget constraint, equation 6 says that in period
1, parents allocate their income on current consumption and the schooling investment of
their own child and the non-biological child.
2.1 Equilibrium
Parents choose the level of schooling of the two children, S1b and S1nb to maximize their
life time utility as given by equation 1, subject to transfers that the two children will
make in retirement represented by equation 3, and subject to the budget constraint 6.
Substituting equations 3 to 6 into equation 1, the utility maximization problem of the
parents is formally expressed as;
Max
S1b;S1nb
U = G(Y   P1bS1b   P1nbS1nb) (7)
+V (bS1b + Ib; nbS1nb + Inb; k (bS1b + Ib) + k (nbS1nb + Inb))
The rst order conditions are (compare with Alderman and Gertler 1997, and Alderman
and King 1998);
@G
@C1
P1b =
@V
@W2b
b +
@V
@C2
bk (8)
and
@G
@C1
P1nb =
@V
@W2nb
nb +
@V
@C2
nbk (9)
We assume that  = 1 for simplicity. The two rst order conditions suggest that parents
will invest in the education of each child until the marginal cost of sacricing consumption
in period 1 (left hand side) is equal to the marginal benet in period 2. And the marginal
benet in period 2 is equal to the utility the parents derive from amarginal increase in each
childs human capital plus the marginal utility of second-period consumption multiplied
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by the subjective belief about future transfers per unit of school investment.
2.2 Implications
We now turn to the implications of the model for intrahousehold schooling bias against
a non-biological child. The model predicts two broad sources of intrahousehold schooling
bias against a non-biological child. Bias could be due to non-preference based factors
favouring the biological child, and secondly, it could arise from preference bias against
the non-biological child. These two predictions are formally expressed in the next two
propositions.
Proposition 1 If parents exhibit no preference bias against the non-biological child, the
non-biological child will receive less schooling i.e. S1b > S1nb when at least one of the
following holds:
i) Direct and indirect costs of educating the non-biological child are higher than those
of the biological child i.e. P1b < P1nb:
ii) Returns to education of the non-biological child are lower than those of the biological
child i.e. b > nb:
iii) The subjective belief about how much the non-biological child will transfer in old age
is lower than that of the biological child i.e. 1 > k for k > 1. Further to this, the
schooling bias worsens, if the subjective belief decreases as the relationship with the
non-biological child becomes distant i.e. 1 > 2 > 3; :::
Proof. Assuming that the marginal benet (right hand side of 8 and 9) is the same,
S1b > S1nb holds only if P1b < P1nb: No preference bias means @V@W2b =
@V
@W2nb
, and @
2V
@W 22b
=
@2V
@W 22nb
; when S1b = S1nb: Now assuming that the marginal cost (left hand side of 8 and
9) is equal, means that @V
@W2b
b +
@V
@C2
bk =
@V
@W2b
nb +
@V
@C2
nbk. With b > nb; this
equality holds only if S1b > S1nb; due to the concavity of schooling in the parents utility
function. Similarly, with 1 > k for k > 1; and concavity of schooling, this equality
prevails only if S1b > S1nb: Thus, S1b > S1nb (bias) occurs if i) P1b < P1nb or ii) b > nb
or iii) 1 > k: Further to this, when we have 1 > 2 > 3; ::: the schooling gap must be
widening.
The cost especially the indirect opportunity cost of educating a non-biological child may
be higher than that for the biological child owing to the possibility that a non-biological
child is more likely to be sent out to work (child labour) to supplement household income.
The forgone income from the non-biological child makes it more costly to send him/her
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to school. The returns to schooling for the non-biological child may be lower in Africa
where most of the non-biological children are orphans due to parental death caused by
HIV/ AIDS. For example, Case et al. (2004, p 484 ) argue that;
"orphans may also be more likely than nonorphans to have HIV/AIDS
because of maternal-child transmission, which could depress schooling. In ad-
dition, the returns to schooling could be reduced by the experiences surrounding
the death of a parent, including time lost from school during the parents illness
and death and emotional scarring that may compromise the childs ability to
learn."
The stigma that often follows those children whose parents died of HIV/Aids may leave
emotional scars which could quite possibly a¤ect their future returns to education. As
Gachuhi (1999) contends, the psychological e¤ects of having to cope with pervasive illness
and death, and the debilitating impact of the stigmatization associated with HIV/AIDS
can be a detriment to learning. Since parents can cannot observe a priori a childs future
transfers to them in old age, they form a subjective belief that due to the biological
ties, their own o¤spring will transfer a higher fraction of his/her income, than the non-
biological child with whom they have weaker ties, and the ties with the non-biological
child get weaker and weaker the more distant is the relationship. The idea that biological
relatedness matters is aptly expressed by evolutionary biologist Hamilton (1964a,b) in
what is called Hamiltonrule which is expressed as follows;
"The social behavior of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct
behavior evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighborst-
ness against his own according to the coe¢ cients of relationship appropriate
to that situation."(1964b, p 19.)
The rule suggests that the degree of altruism is an increasing function of biological re-
latedness, that is a child would care more about his parents than a distant relative10. At
the empirical level, Case et al. (2004) show that the probability of school enrollment is
inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the household head, re-
gardless of whether the child is an orphan or not11. Thus, intrahousehold discrimination
10It should be pointed that the standard Hamilton coe¢ cient of relatedness works the other way i.e.
low values of the coe¢ cient imply low values of biological relatedness. Our reformulation where higher
k denotes a more distantly related non-biological child does not a¤ect the spirit of the Hamiltons rule.
11Biological relatedness transcends schooling, for example, Bishai et al. (2003), nd that reduced
biological relatedness is associated with reduced child survival in Uganda. Case et al. (2000), nd that
households in which a child is raised by an adoptive, step or foster mother, less is spent on food in the
US and South Africa.
9
against a non-biological child can arise due to the aforementioned non-preference based
conditions. Schooling bias in households can also arise if parents have preference bias
against the non-biological child, this is formally expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If parents exhibit preference bias against the non-biological child, the
non-biological child will receive less schooling i.e. S1b > S1nb:
Proof. Preference bias means @V
@W2b
> @V
@W2nb
, and @
2V
@W 22b
> @
2V
@W 22nb
; when S1b = S1nb: Now
assuming that the marginal cost (left hand side of 8 and 9) is equal, and b = nb means
that @V
@W2b
b+
@V
@C2
bk =
@V
@W2nb
b+
@V
@C2
bk. Therefore, with preference bias this equality
holds only if S1b > S1nb; since utility is concave in school investment.
Thus if parents get more satisfaction from the income of their own child relative to the
biological child, the non-biological child receives less schooling. In summary, the model
predicts four possible sources of intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-biological
child. Firstly, a non-biological child will receive less schooling if the cost (direct and
indirect) of educating him/her is higher than that of the own child. Secondly, there will
be less schooling investment in a non-biological child relative to a biological one if the
returns to education for a non-biological child are lower. Thirdly, there will be schooling
bias against a non-biological child if the belief of how much the own child will transfer in
old age is higher than that of the non-biological child. Further, schooling bias against a
non-biological child is worse, the more distantly related he/she is to the parents. Finally,
the non-biological child will have less schooling if parents exhibit preference bias against
him/her, in the sense that they get more utility from the income of the own child if the
income is the same.
2.3 Comparative statics
As discussed earlier, the study seeks to investigate di¤erences in the human capital for-
mation (schooling) of the biological child and non-biological child following changes in
the cost of schooling as well as changes in household income. In addition, the study
examines the di¤erences in the relationship between household income and the change in
school investment due to cost changes for the two children. We answer these questions
by conducting comparative static exercises. The results of the comparative exercise are
summarized in the next two propositions.
Proposition 3 Assuming that P1b = P1nb = P1, and the bias sources discussed earlier
prevail, the following holds;
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i) an increase in costs leads to a bigger reduction in schooling for the non-biological
child relative to the biological one.
ii) an increase in household income leads to a bigger increase in schooling for the non-
biological child relative to the biological one.
iii) and the gap between the two children following these changes gets wider the more
distantly related the non-biological child is.
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem to di¤erentiate the rst order conditions as
given in equations 8 and 9, with respect to cost P1
we get @S1b
@P1
=
@G
@C1
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2b
2b+
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2
< 0,
and @S1nb
@P1
=
@G
@C1
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2nb
2b+
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2
< 0: Therefore, with preference bias or b > nb
or 1 > k for k > 1, the following is true j@S1b@P j < j@S1nb@P j. Similarly, di¤erentiating 8
and 9, with respect to household income Y; we get @S1b
@Y
=
@2G
@C21
P 21
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2b
2b+
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2
> 0
and @S1nb
@Y
=
@2G
@C21
P 21
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2nb
2b+
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2
> 0:Therefore, with preference bias or b > nb or
1 > k for k > 1, the following holds
@S1b
@Y
< @S1nb
@Y
. It must be the case that the gap
following these changes widens when we have 1 > 2 > 3; ::::
Thus, when there is intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-biological child origi-
nating from the sources discussed earlier, the schooling of a non-biological child is more
sensitive to changes in costs and income. This suggests an asymmetry in the way a
family would respond to cost and income shocks to the household. That is, if a fam-
ily experiences a shock to their income, the schooling of the non-biological child in the
house will su¤er more relative to the biological children. The same implication holds
with respect to cost shocks. Further, this non-neutrality in household response to income
and cost changes for the two children gets more asymmetric the more distantly related
the non-biological child is. This suggests that a non-biological child who is not related
to the parents would have his/her schooling su¤er more following cost increases and a
decline in a households economic status. In terms of policy interventions, the theoretical
predictions imply that e¤orts aimed at ghting poverty would go a long way in improving
the schooling of non-biological children.
Proposition 4 Assuming that P1b = P1nb = P1,@
3G
@C31
> 0,
@G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21 >
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21 +
@2V
@W 22b
2b +
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2

,and
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@G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21 >
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21 +
@2V
@W 22nb
2nb +
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2

;
and the bias sources discussed earlier prevail, the change in schooling due to a change in
costs P1;
i) falls with household income.
ii) and the fall is faster for the non-biological child relative to the biological child
i.e.there is convergence in the sense that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes
between the biological and the non-biological child declines as household income in-
creases.
iii) the more distantly related the non-biological child is, the faster the convergence.
Proof. Using the result from the preceding proof, it can be shown that
@

@S1b
@P1

@Y
=
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2b
2b+
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2

  @G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2b
2b+
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2
2 < 0
if @G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21 >
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21 +
@2V
@W 22b
2b +
@2V
@C22
(bk)
2

, and
@

@S1nb
@P1

@Y
=
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2nb
2b+
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2

  @G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21
@2G
@C21
P 21+
@2V
@W2
2nb
2nb+
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2
2 < 0 if
@G
@C1
@3G
@C31
P 21 >
@2G
@C21

@2G
@C21
P 21 +
@2V
@W 22nb
2nb +
@2V
@C22
(nbk)
2

.
It therefore must be the case that
@

@S1b
@P1

@Y
<
@

@S1nb
@P1

@Y
; if there is preference bias or b > nb
or 1 > k for k > 1. And the fall gets bigger with decreasing biological relatedness i.e.
when we have 1 > 2 > 3; :::
This result implies that when there is intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-
biological child emanating from the sources discussed earlier, the impact of changes
in costs on schooling is bigger for low income households compared with high income
households. There is therefore an asymmetry between poor households and non poor
households regarding how they respond to cost changes. That is, an increase in cost of
schooling leads to a bigger reduction in schooling for poor households. The model further
suggests that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes between the biological and
the non-biological child declines as household income increases. That is, as households
become richer, the impact of cost changes on the schooling of the two children converges.
Besides, the model suggests that this convergence as household income increases is faster
the more distantly related the non-biological child is. This has policy signicance, in that
improvements in the economic status of households would lead to a reduction in bias
against non-biological children. The assumption that @
3G
@C31
> 0 deserves some comment.
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A positive third derivative of consumption implies that @G
@C1
is a convex function of con-
sumption. And the value
@3G
@C31
@2G
@C21
is similar to the coe¢ cient of relative prudence by Kimball
(1990). In Kimballs theory of precautionary saving under uncertainty, a higher coe¢ -
cient of relative prudence implies that economic agents become more prudent following
an increase in their income by reducing consumption, and hence engange in precaution-
ary saving. In our model, we argue by analogy that the assumption of a positive third
derivative of current consumption entails that parents act "prudently" by reducing cur-
rent consumption and investing more in the education of children following an increase
in income. It has to be pointed out though that the analogy is hardly perfect.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Hypotheses tested
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test the predictions of the preceding theoretical
model using empirical data. We specically test the following hypotheses:
1. An improvement in household economic status has a larger increase in the schooling
of non-biological children relative to own children, and the increase is larger the more
distantly related the non-biological children are.
2. An increase in the cost of schooling leads to a bigger decrease in the schooling of
non-biological children relative to own children, and the increase is larger the more
distantly related the non-biological children are.
3. The decrease in schooling due to cost increases is negatively related to household
economic status.
4. As household economic status improves, the fall in schooling as a result of cost
increases for non-biological children converges to that of biological children, and
converges faster the more distantly related the non-biological children are.
3.2 Model specication
In order to test these hypotheses, we use two measures of schooling outcome namely;
the highest grade attained and current school enrolment. These two measures represent
di¤erent conceptualizations of schooling. They capture di¤erent dimensions of schooling,
and therefore can be viewed as complementary. Each measure of schooling outcome is
modeled using a di¤erent econometric model.
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3.2.1 Grade attainment
The advantage of grade attainement over current school enrolment is that it represents
the cumulative investment in a childs education, that is current school enrolment ignores
the fact that current schooling depends on previous levels of schooling. We use the
censored ordered probit to model grade attainment. The censored ordered probit model
was originally developed by King and Lillard (1987) to study grade attainment. It has
subsequently been used to study grade attainment by among others; Glewwe and Jacoby
(1994), Alderman et al. (1996), Behrman et al. (1997), Holmes (1999), and Maitra
(2003). The censored ordered probit addresses three problems which are inherent in
grade attainment. Firstly, the model allows for the fact that grade attainment represents
ordered discrete choices i.e. whether to move to the next grade or withdraw. Secondly, it
accommodates the possibility that grade attainment often exhibits a large mass point at
zero years of schooling and similar probability spikes at primary and secondary completion
levels where graduating to the next grade is impeded by fees or entrance examinations
(Holmes 1999). Finally, it addresses the problem that grade attainment is right censored.
Right censoring occurs because for those children who are still in school, their nal grade
attained is unknown and to treat their grade as being equal to those who have stopped
at that grade would lead to biased estimates of the e¤ects of regressors on true grade
attainment (Glick and Sahn 2000).
Following Holmes (1999) and Maitra (2003), the censored ordered probit is formally
expressed as follows;
Si = X
0
i + "i (10)
where Si is a continuous, and unobserved latent variable representing desired level of
schooling for child i; X 0i is a vector of variables which explain schooling,  is a vector of
parameters including a constant, and "i is an error term. The observed level of completed
schooling outcomes Si; has J discrete possible outcomes, Si = 0; 1; 2::J which follow a
natural ordering i.e. grade 2 is higher than grade 1, etc. For those children who have
completed schooling (uncensored observations), the observed level of completed schooling
Si is given as12;
12We have suppressed subcript i to avoid notational clutter.
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S = 0 if S  0
S = 1 if 0 < S  1
S = 2 if 1 < S
  2
... (11)
= J if J 1  S
s are threshold parameters (cut o¤ points)13 which denote a transition from one grade
to the next where the next grade is higher than the previous, and J denotes the highest
attainable schooling grade. For those with no schooling, we know only that the latent
variable falls below the lowest threshold, i.e. S < 0, and for those with the maximum
level of schooling, we know that J 1  S. Under the assumption that the error term
" follows a standard normal distribution14, the conditional probability of observing each
schooling outcome is;
Pr (S = 0) =  ( X 0)
Pr (S = 1) =  (1  X 0)   ( X 0)
Pr (S = 2) =  (2  X 0)   (1  X 0)
... (12)
Pr (S = J) = 1    J 1  X 0
For all probabilities to be positive, the following condition is imposed;
0 < 1 < 2 <   J 1 (13)
The likelihood function for the uncensored observations (LU) is expressed as;
LU =
8><>:
 ( X 0) for S = 0
 (S  X 0)  
 
S 1  X 0

for S = 1; ::::J   1
1    S 1  X 0 for S = J (14)
If there is no right censoring, the likelihood function LU , is equivalent to that of the
standard ordered probit model. For children who are still enrolled in school (censored
13We can alternatively assume that the parameter vector  does not include a constant, and then
include it as the rst cut o¤ point i.e. the zero is replaced with a constant.
14Assuming that the error term follows a logistic distribution, would give us a censored ordered logit.
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observations), the highest grade attained is unknown. However, we know that a currently
enrolled student will ultimately attain at least his or her current grade. Thus, the current
grade level represents a lower bound, which means that the desired level of schooling S
is bounded from below i.e. S  S 1: The probability of achieving at least the current
grade is therefore;
1    S 1  X 0 for S = 0; 1; 2::J (15)
Thus the likelihood function for censored observations (LC) is;
LC = 1  
 
S 1  X 0

(16)
The likelihood function for the sample (L) is therefore given as15;
L =
Y
LU
Y
LC (17)
If there is no right censoring and J = 1, the likelihood function L reduces to that of a
probit model. So the probit model is a special case.
Since the hypotheses we are testing rely on the magnitude of coe¢ cients as well as their
direction, we use elasticities. And the elasticity of probability for each grade in the
censored ordered probit is expressed as;
@E(SjX)
@X
X
E(SjX) =

@ Pr (S = 0)
@X
X
Pr (S = 0)

 0
+

@ Pr (S = 1)
@X
X
Pr (S = 1)

 1
+

@ Pr (S = 2)
@X
X
Pr (S = 2)

 2 (18)
...
+

@ Pr (S = J)
@X
X
Pr (S = J)

 J
In this study, the elasticities of probability are computed at the sample means of the
regressors.
15The estimation of the censored ordered probit was done by using Stata code written by Haaga O
(2003), and available online at
http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2003-08/msg00426.html
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3.2.2 Current school enrolment
The advantage of current enrolment status over grade attainment as a measure of school-
ing is that it allows us to accommodate time varying e¤ects. Using current school
enrolment enables us to better capture the contemporaneous e¤ect of household struc-
ture and income which change overtime (Glick and Sahn 2000). In terms of household
structure, the arrival of new children either through new births or fostering, may alter
the allocation of time to schooling and household work, and this may a¤ect schooling
outcomes of the children. Besides, since we are looking at the schooling of non-biological
children (in relation to biological children), their grade attainment may not reect the
schooling investment of their current care givers. In this study, we model the enrolment
decision using a probit model.
3.3 Variables used
For highest grade attained, in this study we have four discrete and ordered categories
dened for each child as;
S =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if no education attained
1 if highest education attained is junior primary
2 if highest education attained is senior primary
3 if highest education attained is secondary
(19)
Junior primary corresponds to standards 1 to 5, and senior primary corresponds to stan-
dards 6 to 8. For secondary, we have merged junior secondary (forms 1 and 2) with senior
secondary (forms 3 and 4), because in our dataset there are few children we have gone
as far secondary school. Current school enrolment is a dummy variable dened for each
child as;
Enrol =
(
1 if currently enrolled
0 otherwise
(20)
What this e¤ectively means compared to grade attainment, is that every child who is in
school is given a one, and a zero is given to those who should be in school but are not.
Both grade attainment and enrolment status are dened by age, we discuss the details
later.
The key explanatory variables for this study are annual household income and school cost.
We use the log of per capita annual consumption expenditure as our measure of household
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economic status other than actual household income16. To measure the cost of schooling,
we use local child wages prevailing in the area, that is we use the average community
level child wage (measured in Malawian Kwacha)17. Local child wages represent the
opportunity cost (indirect cost) of sending children to school if the alternative is to work
in the farm, family business or other market work (Tansel 1997)18. Other explanatory
variables included in the two models are; age and sex of the child, mothers and fathers
employment status, mothers and fathers education, mothers and fathers age, household
size. We include a rural dummy to control for possible rural-urban di¤erences. We also
control for regional xed e¤ects by including regional dummies. A full description of the
explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis is given in Table A1 in the appendix.
3.4 Estimation issues
The log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, and this may lead to biased
and inconsistent results. One possible channel of endogeneity is that the log of per capita
expenditure and spending on education can be jointly determined through labour supply
decisions in the sense that a decision to send children to school may be jointly determined
with a decision to send the children to work to supplement household income. Another
route for endogeneity would be that parents with a good taste for the education of their
children may work harder so they are able to pay for their schooling (Kingdon 2005).
We address this problem in both the probit and censored ordered probit by using the
Rivers and Vuong (1989) procedure. The procedure is done in two stages. In the rst
stage, a reduced form regression of an endogenous variable is regressed using ordinary least
squares (OLS) on exogenous variables including instruments and residuals are predicted.
In the second stage, the predicted residuals are included in the probit or the censored
ordered probit including the endogenous variable. A simple t-test of the coe¢ cient on the
residual, tests the null hypothesis of exogeneity. We use household assets namely hectares
16We use consumption expenditure other than income for two reasons. First, particularly in an agricul-
tural economy such as Malawi, income is often very lumpy. Farming households receive a large amount
of cash income in May and June after the harvest, and receive very little the rest of the year. In con-
trast, households are constantly expending their income and consuming. Consumption expenditure is a
smoother measure of welfare through time than is income. In other words, consumption can be viewed as
realized welfare, whereas income is more a measure of potential welfare (Murkhejee and Benson 2003).
Second, in Malawi much of household income is derived from self-employed business or subsistence-
oriented agricultural production. Assigning income values to the proceeds of these enterprises is often
problematic (Hentschel and Lanjouw 1996).
17This is measured as follows; for those children who work, the survey data has information on the
wages that they get, we use these wages (after annualising them to ensure comparability with the other
variables) to then compute a community level average wage.
18The two types of children face the same local child wages. Recall, that our comparative static exercise
was based on the assumption that the biological and non-biological child face the same school costs i.e
P1b = P1nb = P1:
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of land, and its square as instrumental variables for log of per capita expenditure19. An
instrumental variable (IV) must be correlated with the endogenous variable (log of per
capita expenditure in our case), but uncorrelated with the error term for the probit or
the censored ordered probit i.e. the IV must be redundant in the probit or the censored
ordered probit once log of per capita expenditure is included. Thus, the e¤ect of the IV
on schooling must work through log of per capita expenditure only. As is shown later
land and its square are correlated with log of per capita expenditure. Land is an illiquid
asset, and therefore is unlikely to be sold in the short term to cover schooling expenses
(Kingdon 2005).
3.5 Data and descriptives
The data used in the study is obtained from the Second Malawi Integrated Household
Survey (IHS2). This is a nationally representative sample survey designed to provide
information on the various aspects of household welfare in Malawi. The survey was
conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2004 -April 2005. The survey
collected information from a nationally representative sample of 11,280 households. This
data contain detailed information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of
the households. The survey collects information on the education status of all children
such as the highest grade attained and current enrollment status. It records the relation-
ship of each child to the household head. This allows us to distinguish in each household,
biological children from non-biological ones. It further enables us to separate the non-
biological children into whether they are related or unrelated to their care givers. Since
we are focussing on intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological children, we re-
strict our sample to blended households, that is households which have both biological
and non-biological children. For grade attainment, we restrict the childrens ages to be-
tween 10 and 19. This restriction is necessitated by the fact that this enables us to some
extent to separate out non-enrolment from late enrolment which is common in Malawi.
Non-enrolment could either be due to late entry into school or parents not deciding to
send a child to school at all. The lower age limit 10 therefore ensures that a child who
has not enrolled in school by the age of 10 will never do so. The upper age limit of 19 is
driven by the fact that this helps us to some extent to mitigate the problem of sample
selection where older children are absent from home20. For current school enrolment, we
restrict childrens ages to between 6 and 19. We have a total of 10241 children of whom
8347 (representing 82%) are biological, and 1894 (representing 18%) are non-biological.
Of the non-biological children, 1534 (representing 81%) are relatives, and the remainder
19Similar instruments are used by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994), and Glewwe and Ilias (1996).
20Similar sample restrictions are imposed in other studies e.g. Glick and Sahn (2000), Maitra (2003),
Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu (2007).
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360 (representing 19%) are non-relatives.
We now look at the descriptive statistics. In Table 1, we report grade attainment rates of
biological and non-biological children, and the results show that biological children have
consistently higher attainments at all schooling levels. The results also indicate that non-
biological children that are not related to the people who keep them fare badly in terms
of attainment as compared to those who are related. We also notice that attainment
declines with age, and the decline is more pronounced for non-biological children who are
not relatives. For instance, the results indicate that 7.8% of biological children attained
secondary education compared to 2.17% of non-biological children who are not relatives.
The widening gap in attainment between biological and non-biological children as they
get older may be a reection of early withdrawals from school by the non-biological
children or grade repetition. The withdrawals may increase with age due to the fact that
as the children get older they can be a source of labor for agriculture and other income
generating activities to supplement household income. And this need for child labour is
stronger for non-biological children especially those who are not relatives. There may be
a direct cost dimension to this as well, in the sense that at lower ages (coinciding with
primary school) education is free in Malawi, and at higher ages (coinciding with secondary
school) parents have to pay fees among other things which might discourage attainment
of secondary education. Either way, this may suggest bias against non-biological children,
and that this bias gets worse when a child is not a relative. When we use current enrolment
to measure schooling (see Table 2), a similar picture emerges. For example, for the age
range 15-19, the results show that 78.% of biological children are still in school compared
to just 63.8% and 51.2% of non-biological children who are relatives and non-biological
children who are not relatives respectively.
Table 3, reports enrolment rates by income quintile. We observe that children in the
wealthiest households have higher enrolment rates regardless of whether they are biolog-
ical or not. For all quintiles, the results consistently show that biological children have
higher enrolment rates. For instance, for the lowest quintile and comparing biological
children with non-biological children, the results indicate that biological children have a
higher enrolment rate of 94% compared to 76.9% for non-biological children. Looking at
the highest quintile and comparing biological children with non-biological children, the
results show that biological children have a higher enrolment rate of 96.2% compared
to 93.1% for non-biological children. The results also show that non-biological children
who are not relatives have consistently lower enrolment rates across all quintiles. The
relationship between enrolment rates and the opportunity cost of schooling as measured
by local child wages is presented in Table 4. The results show that the enrolment rate for
all children declines as the opportunity cost of schooling increases. Comparing the lowest
cost bracket (0-100) with the highest cost bracket (801+), we nd that the enrolment rate
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of non-biological children drops more sharply compared to that of biological children21.
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis are
presented in the appendix Table A2.
4 Econometric results
The descriptive results show that the schooling of non-biological children however mea-
sured is worse than that of biological children. We pursue this matter further by testing
the hypotheses highlighted earlier. As earlier discussed, the log of per capita expenditure
is potentially endogenous, we therefore conducted exogeneity tests in the probit as well
as the censored ordered probit models using the Rivers and Vuong procedure outlined
before. We reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the log of per capita expenditure
in all probit models estimated. For all censored probit models estimated, we nd that
the log of per capita expenditure is exogenous. The reduced form regressions of log of
per capita expenditure reported in the appendix Table A3, show that the instrumental
variables land and its square perform reasonably well as they are signicantly correlated
with the log of per capita expenditure.
We now look at the four hypotheses outlined earlier. We test the hypotheses by computing
elasticities of probability for the censored ordered probit and the probit models estimates
using children who stay in blended households. The elasticities of probability are com-
puted at the sample means of the regressors. While controlling for the parental and
household characteristics of the childrens care givers, we estimate separate regressions
for all biological children, and all non-biological children, who are further demarcated
into non-biological children who are relatives and non-biological children who are non-
relatives. The relationship between raw coe¢ cients (^s) and elasticities of probability in
an ordered probit model deserves some mention. The elasticity of probability of the rst
outcome (no education) with respect to any regressor has the opposite sign to that of the
regressors coe¢ cient. The elasticity of probability of the highest outcome (secondary
education) with respect to any regressor has the same sign as the regressors coe¢ cient.
For the intermediate outcomes there is no simple relationship between the elasticities of
probability with respect to any regressor and corresponding regressor coe¢ cients. Thus,
for the lowest and highest education outcomes, the relationship between the elasticity of
probability with respect to any regressors coe¢ cient is unambiguous22.
Table 5, presents computed elasticities of probability with respect to income as proxied
by the log of per capita expenditure for the censored ordered probit and probit models,
21Results for descriptive analysis of grade attainment versus income or opportunity cost of schooling
are similar, we have therefore not reported them to conserve space.
22These relationships can be seen by partially di¤erentiating equation 18 with respect to any variable.
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to examine whether the schooling of non-biological children increases more relative to that
of biological children following an increase in household income (rst hypothesis). For the
non-biological children, we further separate them into whether they are related to the care
givers they stay with or not. This separation allows us to further investigate di¤erences
in schooling responsiveness to income changes between children who are relatives and
those who are not. The raw coe¢ cients for the censored ordered probit and probit
models which are used to compute these elasticities are presented in Tables A4 and A5
respectively in the appendix. Using grade attainment as our measure of schooling, the
results show that non-biological children have higher income elasticities (in absolute value
terms) compared to non-biological children. We observe that the grade attainment of non-
biological children who are not relatives is more income elastic compared to non-biological
children who are relatives. For example, at the secondary school level, non-biological
children who are relatives have an income elasticity of 1.77 compared to 1.82 for non-
biological children who are not relatives. A closer look at the magnitude of the elasticities
indicates that non-biological children have greater than one elasticities and biological
children have less than one elasticities. This implies that the education of non-biological
children is considered a luxury good. And education becomes more luxurious if the non-
biological children are non-relatives. The computed elasticities for all children also show
that the income elasticity increases as we move up the education hierarchy i.e. from no
education to secondary education. This means that higher education levels are considered
a luxury. Further to that, the income elasticity as one moves up the education system are
consistently largest for the non-biological children who are non-relatives, thus suggesting
that for children who are non-relatives their further education is considered more of a
luxury good relative to non-biological children who are relatives and own children. We
get a similar picture when we use current enrolment to measure schooling. These results
therefore conrm the hypothesis that an improvement in household economic status has a
larger increase in the schooling of non-biological children relative to own children, and the
increase is larger the more distantly related the non-biological children are. This nding
is invariant to choice of schooling measure. This nding suggests that policies aimed at
ghting poverty would improve the schooling outcomes of non-biological children.
In Table 6, we report censored ordered probit and probit elasticities to examine whether
the schooling of non-biological children falls more relative to that of biological children
following an increase in costs (second hypothesis). Again for the non-biological children,
we further separate them into whether they are related to the care givers they stay with
or not. The raw coe¢ cients for censored ordered probit and probit models which are
used to compute these elasticities are presented in Tables A4 and A5 respectively in the
appendix. When we use grade attainment as a measure of schooling the computed price
elasticities (in absolute value terms) indicate consistently for all grade levels that the
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schooling of non-biological children is more price elastic compared to that of biological
children. Further to that, the results show that unrelated biological children have higher
price elasticities relative to non-biological children who are relatives. For instance, when
we look at the secondary level, non-biological children who are relatives have a price
elasticity of -0.35 compared to -0.38 for non-biological children who are not relatives. We
also note that for all children the price elasticities increase as we move from the lowest
educational level (no education) to the highest (secondary education). This suggests
that households become more responsive to school cost changes as a child goes up the
education ladder. This responsiveness is more pronounced for non-biological children who
are not relatives. When we use current enrolment as our measure of schooling we get
similar conclusions. So our results conrm the hypothesis that an increase in the cost
of schooling leads to a bigger decrease in the schooling of non-biological children relative
to own children, and the increase is larger the more distantly related the non-biological
children are. And this conclusion is robust to how schooling is measured. This nding
has policy relevance in the sense that interventions to end child labour would benet
non-biological children a lot.
Results of tests of hypotheses 3 and 4, are reported in Tables 7 and 8 for the censored
ordered probit and probit models respectively. Here we estimate elasticities of probability
with respect to price for the two models at di¤erent consumption expenditure quintiles
to ascertain the relationship between price elasticities as we move up the income ladder
i.e. moving from the poorest households to the wealthiest households. Like before, for
the non-biological children we further separate them into whether they are related to the
care givers they stay with or not. The corresponding raw coe¢ cients for censored ordered
probit and probit models which are used to compute these elasticities are presented in
Tables A6-A9 and A10-A13 respectively in the appendix. Using grade attainment as our
measure of schooling, the results for all children show that the computed price elasticities
fall as we move from the poorest households (1st quintile) to the wealthiest households (5th
quintile). For example, looking at senior primary education for biological children, the
results show that the 1st quintile has a price elasticity of -0.29 compared with -0.15 for the
5th quintile. This indicates an asymmetry in schooling responsiveness following changes
in costs between poor households and rich households in the sense that poor households
are more price elastic compared to rich households. The results also show that the price
elasticities of non-biological children move towards those of biological children as we
move up from the poorest households (1st quintile) to the wealthiest households (5th
quintile), thus suggesting a convergence of price elasticities as household economic status
improves. We further note that this convergence is faster for the non-biological children
who are non-relatives. When school enrolment is used, we arrive at similar conclusions.
Essentially, these ndings lead to the acceptance of hypotheses 3 and 4. That is, the
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decrease in schooling due to cost increases is negatively related to household economic
status, and as household economic status improves the fall in schooling as a result of cost
increases converges, and converges faster the more distantly related the non-biological
children are. This conclusion is independent of how the schooling of children is measured.
This conclusion has policy implications in that e¤orts to improve the economic status of
households would lead to an improvement in schooling of non-biological children.
5 Conclusions
The paper has looked at the intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological children
in a family at both the theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, we have
looked at the possible sources of schooling bias against non-biological children and how
schooling responds to changes in household economic status and schooling costs. This
has been done by constructing a two period model in which parents work and invest in a
biological and non-biological child in the rst period, and retire in the second. The parents
survive on remittances from both children in old age. The model predicts discrimination
against a non-biological child can stem from either non-preference based conditions which
favour the biological child, and/or can originate from a pure preference bias against a
non-biological child. Specically, the model shows that parents will invest more in the
education of their own child if costs, especially opportunity cost of schooling are higher
for the non-biological child, or if returns to education of the own child are higher than
those for the non-biological child, or if the subjective belief that parents have about future
transfers during retirement is lower for the non-biological child relative to the biological
child. Further to that, the model predicts that the schooling gap between the biological
child and the non-biological child gets wider as the relationship distance between the non-
biological child and the parents gets wider. We have also shown that schooling against
non-biological children in a household can be a result of pure preference bias by parents
against them, in the sense that they get more satisfaction from the income of their own
child relative to the non-biological child.
The model also shows that there is an asymmetry in the impact of changes in costs and
income on schooling in the sense that the impact is larger for the non-biological child.
We have also shown that an increase in cost of schooling leads to a bigger reduction
in schooling for poor households, and that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes
between the biological and the non-biological child declines as income increases. An
empirical investigation of these predictions using the SecondMalawi Integrated Household
Survey (IHS2) data has shown that when current enrolment and grade attainment are
used to measure schooling, the price (measured as the opportunity cost of schooling) and
income elasticities of schooling are larger for non-biological children. It has been found
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that non-biological children who are unrelated to their care givers have higher price and
income elasticities. The empirical analysis has also indicated that households in the
lowest income quintile (the poorest) have the largest price elasticities, and households
in the highest income quintile (the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. It
has been demostrated that the price elasticities for biological and non-biological children
converge as we move from the lowest income quintile to the highest income quintile, and
that the convergence is faster for non-biological children who are non-relatives.
The integrated household survey data presents some limitations to the study which are
worth mentioning. The survey did not collect information on quality of children such as
IQ scores, which might a¤ect grade attainment and school enrolment of biological and
non-biological children. Secondly, the survey data does not have information on the past
schooling performance of the children. Past schooling performance of the non-biological
children before moving to their current care givers may also a¤ect their current schooling
in the sense that current care givers may have little incentive to send a non-biological
child to school if s/he was struggling academically before coming to them. Since we do
not control for these factors in our empirical analysis, our conclusions should be taken
with due cognizance of these limitations.
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Table 1: Grade attainment of children (age 10-19)
Biological Non-biological
Grade All          Related Unrelated
No education 11.21 21.25 18.2 24.3
Junior primary 48.3 45.63 46.54 44.72
Senior primary 32.7 29.34 29.87 28.81
Secondary 7.8 3.78 5.38 2.17
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 2: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19)
Biological Non-biological
Age All          Related Unrelated
6-8 0.947 0.88 0.913 0.847
9-11 0.948 0.863 0.894 0.832
12-14 0.857 0.738 0.762 0.713
15-19 0.783 0.575 0.638 0.512
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Table 3: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19) by expenditure quintile
Biological Non-biological
Quintile All          Related Unrelated
1st 0.940 0.769 0.783 0.754
2nd 0.918 0.812 0.831 0.793
3rd 0.937 0.886 0.916 0.856
4th 0.944 0.922 0.921 0.923
5th 0.962 0.931 0.934 0.927
Table 4: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19) and opportunity cost of schooling
Biological Non-biological
Age All          Related Unrelated
0-100 0.882 0.84 0.864 0.816
101-400 0.891 0.802 0.837 0.767
401-800 0.887 0.687 0.712 0.662
801+ 0.844 0.563 0.631 0.494
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Table 5: Income elasticities from probit and censored ordered probit models
Biological Non-biological
All          Related Unrelated
Current enrolment
0.89 1.26 1.25 1.29
Grade attainment
No education -0.75 -1.34 -1.33 -1.37
Junior primary 0.79 1.42 1.41 1.43
Senior primary 0.86 1.64 1.62 1.67
Secondary 0.97 1.78 1.77 1.82
Table 6: Price elasticities from probit and censored ordered probit models
Biological Non-biological
All          Related Unrelated
Current enrolment
-0.24 -0.32 -0.31 -0.36
Grade attainment
No education 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.27
Junior primary -0.18 -0.26 -0.25 -0.30
Senior primary -0.22 -0.34 -0.32 -0.36
Secondary -0.28 -0.36 -0.35 -0.38
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Table 7: Price elasticities from censored ordered probit for different income quintiles
Biological
Quintile No education Junior primary Senior primary Secondary
1st 0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.32
2nd 0.20 -0.25 -0.26 -0.29
3rd 0.17 -0.21 -0.23 -0.25
4th 0.13 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21
5th 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17
Non-biological: All
1st 0.29 -0.31 -0.34 -0.38
2nd 0.24 -0.29 -0.30 -0.35
3rd 0.20 -0.22 -0.27 -0.30
4th 0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.24
5th 0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19
Non-biological: Related
1st 0.37 -0.38 -0.45 -0.48
2nd 0.27 -0.33 -0.41 -0.43
3rd 0.22 -0.29 -0.34 -0.36
4th 0.13 -0.20 -0.22 -0.23
5th 0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18
Non-biological: Unrelated
1st 0.39 -0.42 -0.46 -0.48
2nd 0.30 -0.35 -0.38 -0.39
3rd 0.19 -0.21 -0.24 -0.26
4th 0.11 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21
5th 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17
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Table 8: Price elasticities from probit for different income quintiles
Biological Non-biological
Quintile All          Related Unrelated
1st -0.26 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35
2nd -0.19 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27
3rd -0.17 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17
4th -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12
5th -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11
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6 Appendix
Table A1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
childage age of a child
childsex =1 if child is male, 0 otherwise
hhsize household size
fathwage =1 if father works for a wage,0 otherwise
mothwage =1 if father works for a wage,0 otherwise
edufath Years of education of the father
edumoth Years of education of the mother
agefath Age of the father in years
agefath2 Square of the age of the father
agemoth Age of the mother in years
agemoth2 Square of the age of the mother
lnrexpa log of per capita household consumption expenditure
wage community level child wage
rural =1 if household is in rural area,0 otherwise
north =1 if household is in the north,0 otherwise.
Centre =1 if household is in the centre, 0 otherwise.
Southa =1 if household is in the south, 0 otherwise.
Notes: a denotes reference category.
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Table A2: Sample means (standard errors) of explanatory variables
Variable (1) (2)
agechild       10.828      (4.058) 12.166      (4.409)
childsex       0.521       (0.500) 0.473       (0.499)
lnrexpa       9.568       (0.551) 9.664       (0.597)
hhsize       6.794       (2.405) 6.250       (3.013)
fathwage       0.233       (0.423) 0.192       (0.394)
mothwage       0.050       (0.218) 0.043       (0.202)
edufath       2.015 (3.947) 1.843       (3.951)
edumoth       0.715       (2.439) 0.888       (2.780)
agefath       45.007      (10.069) 47.306      (16.588)
agemoth        38.392      (9.271) 48.027      (19.247)
wage 97.394      (136.178) 99.297     (154.182)
rural       0.908       (0.289) 0.901       (0.299)
north       0.166       (0.372) 0.195       (0.396)
centre       0.427       (0.495) 0.386       (0.487)
south       0.408       (0.491) 0.419       (0.494)
Notes: Column 1 corresponds to the current enrolment sample, and Column 2 corresponds to the grade attainment
sample.
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Table A3: Reduced form regressions of log per capita consumption
Variable (1) (2)
agechild 0.007*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
childsex -0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.011)
fathwage            0.060*** 0.063***
(0.013) (0.013)
mothwage            0.027 -0.009
(0.026) (0.029)
edufath             0.026*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.002)
edumoth             0.042*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.003)
agefath -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.005)
agefath2           0.012*** 0.000***
(0.001) (0.000)
agemoth -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.006)
agemoth2           0.024** 0.031**
(0.003) (0.004)
land               0.015*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.004)
land2 -0.022*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.007)
north               0.019 0.016
(0.014) (0.016)
centre              0.304*** 0.301***
(0.011) (0.012)
constant 9.955*** 10.012***
(0.053) (0.085)
F-test of joint significance of instruments:
F-stat 32.71 27.43
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
F-test of overall significance:
F-stat 22.54 37.39
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.4532 0.4117
Notes: Column 1 corresponds to the current enrolment sample, and Column 2 corresponds to the grade attainment
sample. The instruments for per capita consumption expenditure are land, its square. The significance asterisks are
defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A4: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment by type of child
Biological Non-biological
Grade All                 Related Unrelated
agechild -0.246*** -0.146*** -0.246*** -0.147***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
childsex           0.080*** 0.077 0.081*** 0.078
(0.028) (0.052) (0.028) (0.052)
fathwage            0.070** 0.023 0.067* 0.019
(0.035) (0.072) (0.035) (0.072)
mothwage            0.172*** 0.066 0.015 0.055
(0.003) (0.137) (0.073) (0.137)
edufath             0.050*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
edumoth             0.026*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
agefath -0.003 -0.014 -0.002 -0.014
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
agefath2 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
agemoth             0.019 0.021 0.018 0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
agemoth2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
lnrexpa            0.370*** 0.142*** 0.371*** 0.142***
(0.029) (0.052) (0.029) (0.052)
wage -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
hhsize              0.033*** 0.015 0.034*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
rural -0.181*** -0.253*** -0.175*** -0.264***
(0.050) (0.088) (0.050) (0.088)
north 0.359*** 0.546*** 0.351*** 0.538***
(0.041) (0.072) (0.041) (0.072)
centre -0.162*** 0.103* -0.164*** 0.099
(0.032) (0.061) (0.033) (0.062)
Log likelihood -4321 -5353 -3722 -6167
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A5: Probit results of current enrolment by type of child
Biological Non-biological
Grade All                 Related Unrelated
agechild -0.214*** -0.267*** -0.218*** -0.220***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.039) (0.017)
childsex            0.129** 0.430*** 0.718*** 0.920***
(0.051) (0.092) (0.102) (0.101)
fathwage           0.444** 0.289 0.102 0.068
(0.203) (0.318) (0.348) (0.151)
mothwage           0.652*** 0.108 0.091 0.070
(0.141) (0.259) (0.300) (0.272)
edufath            0.138*** 0.118 0.072 0.058***
(0.006) (0.130) (0.143) (0.017)
edumoth            0.246* 0.106 0.012 0.007
(0.136) (0.204) (0.223) (0.024)
agefath             0.087* 0.047 0.028 0.021
(0.050) (0.072) (0.083) (0.036)
agefath2 -0.011** 0.001 0.026 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
agemoth            0.105* 0.031 0.008 0.001
(0.056) (0.078) (0.087) (0.036)
agemoth2 -0.01* -0.001 -0.003 -0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
lnrexpa            0.353*** 0.192*** 0.664*** 0.961***
(0.053) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
wage -0.217*** -0.321*** 0.334*** 0.413***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
hhsize             0.019* 0.032* -0.003 -0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
rural -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
north               0.185* 0.341** 0.311* 0.303**
(0.096) (0.149) (0.168) (0.147)
centre -2.236** 0.980 0.271 0.121
(0.988) (1.488) (1.624) (0.119)
residcons           6.663** 8.562*** 9.515*** 7.149***
(3.252) (1.911) (1.365) (1.06)
constant -66.159** 28.339 7.804 2.636**
(32.356) (48.877) (53.408) (1.042)
Log likelihood -6339 -2167 -4486 -5413
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A6: Censored ordered probit results biological children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild           0.227***        0.234***    0.226***      0.280***               0.314***
(0.009)         (0.010)    (0.010)         (0.013)                (0.014)
childsex -0.016 -0.089 -0.010 -0.101 -0.231***
(0.057)         (0.059)    (0.060)         (0.068)                (0.075)
fathwage -0.029 -0.026      0.135*          0.223***               0.061
(0.077)         (0.072)    (0.075)         (0.086)                (0.095)
mothwage            0.087           0.355** -0.360** -0.322* -0.007
(0.174)         (0.146)    (0.176) (0.174)                (0.182)
edufath            0.050***        0.041***    0.036***        0.052***               0.068***
(0.010)         (0.009)    (0.009)         (0.009)                (0.009)
edumoth             0.032           0.014      0.019           0.028*                 0.034***
(0.023)         (0.020)    (0.016)         (0.015)                (0.013)
agefath -0.047*          0.022      0.009 -0.021 -0.010
(0.024)         (0.026)    (0.029)         (0.030)                (0.035)
agefath2            0.000 -0.000 -0.000           0.000 -0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)    (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
agemoth             0.081*** -0.017 -0.015 -0.001                  0.020
(0.028)         (0.031)    (0.034)         (0.036)                (0.042)
agemoth2 -0.001***        0.000      0.000           0.000                  0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)    (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
lnrexpa 0.450***       0.651**    0.135           1.124***               0.286**
(0.142)         (0.328)    (0.369)         (0.355)                (0.116)
wage               0.127*** -0.023*** -0.367*** -0.345*** 0.413***
(0.001)         (0.002)    (0.001)         (0.004)                (0.003)
hhsize              0.023**         0.016      0.043***        0.073***               0.040**
(0.011) (0.016)    (0.016)         (0.017)                (0.016)
rural -0.046           0.055 -0.194 -0.192* -0.230**
(0.124)         (0.127)    (0.120)         (0.111) (0.103)
north               0.465***        0.538***    0.320***        0.214*                 0.251**
(0.078)         (0.086)    (0.096)         (0.113)                (0.119)
centre -0.155** -0.229*** -0.223*** -0.153* -0.003
(0.072)         (0.069)    (0.068)         (0.079)                (0.092)
Log likelihood -6567 -5448 -4321 -3389 -5117
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A7: Censored ordered probit results non-biological children by expenditure
quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild 0.158*** 0.170***           0.126***        0.158***               0.160***
(0.017)         (0.019)            (0.015)         (0.016) (0.016)
childsex            0.240*          0.072              0.066           0.165 -0.081
(0.123)         (0.134)            (0.119)         (0.116)                (0.116)
fathwage -0.426*          0.050              0.047           0.088                  0.019
(0.225)         (0.185)            (0.156)         (0.155)                (0.161)
mothwage            0.154 0.406              0.766 -0.643**                0.103
(0.408)         (0.371)            (0.808)         (0.308)                (0.219)
edufath             0.034           0.016              0.027 0.054***               0.043***
(0.024)         (0.026)            (0.018)         (0.016)                (0.015)
edumoth -0.186***        0.105**            0.025           0.074*** 0.032*
(0.071)         (0.041)            (0.029)         (0.025)                (0.018)
agefath -0.055 -0.046 -0.031 -0.004                  0.047
(0.039)         (0.045)            (0.029)         (0.034)                (0.039)
agefath2            0.001           0.000              0.000           0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
agemoth             0.033           0.042 -0.043           0.040 -0.003
(0.038)         (0.048)            (0.031)         (0.037)                (0.038)
agemoth2 -0.000 -0.000              0.001* -0.000                  0.001
(0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)
lnrexpa             0.010           0.437              0.302 -0.363 -0.047
(0.284)         (0.687)            (0.752)         (0.584)                (0.161)
wage -0.321*** -0.237*** -0.364** -0.433** -0.311***
(0.001)         (0.004)            (0.001)         (0.001)                (0.001)
hhsize              0.012 -0.023              0.061*** -0.006                  0.038
(0.019)         (0.024)            (0.023)         (0.025)                (0.026)
rural -0.616**         0.172 -0.269 -0.269 -0.208
(0.242)         (0.252)            (0.225)         (0.206)                (0.164)
north               0.671***        0.592***           0.576***        0.398** 0.634***
(0.161)         (0.193)            (0.165)         (0.161)                (0.177)
centre              0.063 -0.163 -0.072           0.184                  0.249*
(0.157)         (0.161)            (0.142)         (0.126)                (0.131)
Log likelihood -2321 -5478 -6311 -4299 -2139
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A8: Censored ordered probit results non-biological (related) children by
expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild            0.227***        0.234*** 0.226***        0.281***                0.315***
(0.009)         (0.010)          (0.010)         (0.013)                 (0.014)
childsex -0.017 -0.088 -0.010 -0.104 -0.238***
(0.057)         (0.059)          (0.060)         (0.068)                 (0.075)
fathwage -0.040 -0.026            0.135* 0.211**                 0.054
(0.077)         (0.072)          (0.075)         (0.086)                 (0.095)
mothwage            0.074           0.360** -0.364** -0.306* -0.012
(0.174)         (0.146)          (0.176)         (0.174)                 (0.182)
edufath             0.049***        0.040***         0.036***        0.055***                0.069***
(0.010)         (0.009)          (0.009)         (0.009)                 (0.009)
edumoth             0.032           0.015            0.020           0.024                   0.034***
(0.023)         (0.020)          (0.016)         (0.015) (0.013)
agefath -0.045*          0.022            0.009 -0.019 -0.008
(0.024)         (0.026)          (0.029)         (0.030)                 (0.035)
agefath2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000           0.000 -0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)                 (0.000)
agemoth             0.079*** -0.019 -0.014 -0.003                   0.021
(0.028)         (0.031)          (0.034)         (0.036)                 (0.042)
agemoth2 -0.001***        0.000            0.000           0.000 0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)                 (0.000)
lnrexpa             0.451***       0.638*           0.137           1.121***                0.291**
(0.142)         (0.328)          (0.369)         (0.356)                 (0.116)
wage -0.223*** -0.314*** -0.421*** -0.023 -0.043
(0.003)         (0.002)          (0.001) (0.043)                 (0.067)
hhsize              0.023**         0.016            0.043***        0.074***                0.038**
(0.011)         (0.016)          (0.016)         (0.017)                 (0.016)
rural -0.081           0.069 -0.190 -0.166 -0.236**
(0.126)         (0.129)          (0.120)         (0.112)                 (0.104)
north               0.450*** 0.549***         0.317***        0.175                   0.252**
(0.079)         (0.087)          (0.097)         (0.115)                 (0.121)
centre -0.164** -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.161** -0.001
(0.072)         (0.069)          (0.068)         (0.080)                 (0.092)
Log likelihood -3329 -4412 -8342 -7613 -3979
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A9: Censored ordered probit results non-biological (unrelated) children by
expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild            0.160***        0.170***    0.125***        0.162***               0.160***
(0.017)         (0.019)      (0.015)         (0.016)                (0.016)
childsex 0.238*          0.055        0.084           0.181 -0.082
(0.123)         (0.135)      (0.120)         (0.116)                (0.116)
fathwage -0.452**         0.051        0.085           0.125 0.016
(0.228)         (0.186)      (0.159)         (0.158)                (0.162)
mothwage            0.150           0.384        0.796 -0.678**                0.099
(0.409)         (0.374)      (0.810)         (0.310)                (0.220)
edufath             0.033           0.015        0.028           0.051***               0.042***
(0.024)         (0.026)      (0.018)         (0.016)                (0.015)
edumoth -0.188***        0.109***     0.022           0.078***               0.033*
(0.072)         (0.041)      (0.029)         (0.025)                (0.018)
agefath -0.051 -0.042 -0.034 -0.011                  0.046
(0.039)         (0.045)      (0.029)         (0.035)                (0.040)
agefath2            0.000           0.000        0.000           0.000 -0.001**
(0.000)         (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
agemoth             0.031           0.035 -0.043           0.051 -0.003
(0.038)         (0.048)      (0.031)         (0.038) (0.038)
agemoth2 -0.000 -0.000        0.001* -0.000                  0.001
(0.000)         (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
lnrexpa -0.011           0.486 0.227 -0.313 -0.046
(0.288)         (0.693)      (0.759)         (0.587)                (0.162)
wage -0.313*** -0.411*** -0.261*** -0.428*** -0.415***
(0.001)         (0.003)      (0.001)         (0.001)                (0.001)
hhsize              0.013 -0.021        0.060** -0.003                  0.038
(0.020)         (0.024)      (0.024) (0.025)                (0.026)
rural -0.615**         0.227 -0.285 -0.330 -0.210
(0.250)         (0.262)      (0.225)         (0.213)                (0.165)
north               0.673***        0.604***     0.571***        0.406**                0.611***
(0.161)         (0.194)      (0.166)         (0.164)                (0.180)
centre              0.075 -0.159 -0.083           0.207 0.232*
(0.158)         (0.162)      (0.143)         (0.131)                (0.133)
Log likelihood -5388 -3419 -4358 -6931 -4266
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A10: Probit results of biological children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild -0.269*** -0.267*** -0.213*** -0.146*** -0.336**
(0.067)         (0.047)       (0.044)         (0.041)                  (0.134)
childsex            0.106           0.167         0.192* 0.132                    0.266
(0.103)         (0.103)       (0.115)         (0.131)                  (0.180)
fathwage           0.962*          0.878** -0.520           0.547 -1.326
(0.568)         (0.404)       (0.373)         (0.381)                  (1.174)
mothwage           0.842**         0.485* -1.389*** -0.155 -0.844
(0.328)         (0.281)       (0.287)         (0.399) (0.635)
edufath            0.308          0.366** -0.100           0.141 -0.439
(0.247)         (0.171)       (0.156)         (0.149)                  (0.498)
edumoth -0.581 -0.537** -0.127           0.216 -0.829
(0.398)         (0.274)       (0.246)         (0.235)                  (0.796)
agefath             0.153           0.135         0.155 -0.052                    0.266
(0.137)         (0.103)       (0.097)         (0.092)                  (0.275)
agefath2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002*          0.001 -0.003
(0.002)         (0.001)       (0.001)         (0.001)                  (0.003)
agemoth             0.229           0.265**       0.060 -0.167                    0.384
(0.157)         (0.113)       (0.103)         (0.115)                  (0.309)
agemoth2 -0.002 -0.002** -0.000           0.002 -0.003
(0.001)         (0.001)       (0.001)         (0.001)                  (0.002)
lnrexpa             0.385*          0.109***      0.218 -0.089                    0.989***
(0.223)         (0.005)       (0.679)         (0.678)                  (0.352)
wage -0.321*** -0.219*** -0.365***       0.413*** -0.451***
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.001)         (0.002)                  (0.001)
hhsize              0.070*** -0.011 -0.022 -0.017                    0.008
(0.022)         (0.026)       (0.028) (0.027)                  (0.030)
rural               0.160           0.398** -0.018 -0.131 -0.037
(0.186)         (0.188)       (0.227)         (0.245)                  (0.228)
north 0.162           0.029 -0.146           0.502*                   0.281
(0.211)         (0.192)       (0.213)         (0.282)                  (0.450)
centre -4.397 -4.867** -1.713           1.059 -6.088
(2.894)         (1.983)       (1.788)         (1.684)                  (5.807)
residcons          14.041***        14.820**     8.687***        13.671***               19.261***
(2.503) (6.521)       (1.866)         (2.596)                 (2.108)
constant -139.659 -144.169** -46.604          43.518 -199.378
(94.693)        (65.244)    (58.351)        (56.283) (190.196)
Log likelihood -3221 -4771 -7834 -6389 -7227
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A11: Probit results of non-biological children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild -0.296* -0.235*** -0.256*** -0.304*** -0.308*
(0.177)         (0.081)              (0.066)         (0.093)                (0.173)
childsex            0.303           0.187                0.455**         0.253 1.015***
(0.251)         (0.227)              (0.222)         (0.229)                (0.242)
fathwage -0.701           0.006                1.248*          0.252                  1.632
(1.563)         (0.695)              (0.644)         (0.797)                (1.531)
mothwage -0.609           0.985                0.375           0.117                  0.390
(0.878)         (0.776) (0.243)         (0.322)                (0.636)
edufath -0.197           0.204                0.463           0.155                  0.583
(0.662)         (0.289)              (0.368)         (0.512) (1.017)
edumoth -0.427           0.403 -0.182 -0.025 -0.179
(1.090)         (0.462)              (0.132)         (0.184)                (0.341)
agefath             0.143 -0.232                0.002           0.000                  0.002
(0.355)         (0.166)              (0.002)         (0.002)                (0.004)
agefath2 -0.002           0.002 -0.126           0.039 -0.167
(0.004)         (0.002)              (0.144)         (0.193)                (0.381)
agemoth             0.230           0.030                0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.387)         (0.186)              (0.001)         (0.001)                (0.003)
agemoth2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.777           1.100 -0.690**
(0.003)         (0.001)              (1.406)         (1.178)                (0.291)
lnrexpa             0.212 -0.222                0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.475)         (1.203)              (0.001)         (0.003)                (0.002)
wage -0.124*** -0.412***             0.335*** -0.179*** -0.472***
(0.001)         (0.002)              (0.003)         (0.060)                (0.049)
hhsize              0.025           0.002 -0.222 -0.536                  0.094
(0.033)         (0.041)              (0.425)         (0.421)                (0.320)
rural               0.049           0.194                0.728**         0.072                  0.679
(0.378)         (0.450)              (0.335)         (0.406)                (0.516)
north               0.051 0.521                4.389           0.321                  4.410
(0.544)         (0.384)              (2.699)         (3.736)                (7.390)
centre -2.780           2.213 -12.581 -2.212 -13.612
(7.725)         (3.318)              (8.913)        (12.283)               (24.411)
residcons          10.380*** -17.633***            24.127*** -0.220***               0.354***
(1.333)        (2.983)                (2.212          (0.008)                (0.002)
constant -103.381       82.100               136.409          13.959                147.080
(252.640) (111.196)             (92.730)       (122.303)              (242.940)
Log likelihood -9332 -8178 -1977 -2256 -4038
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A12: Probit results of non-biological children (related) by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild -0.174*** -0.167*** -0.186*** -0.171*** -0.205***
(0.014)         (0.015)        (0.018)         (0.020)                (0.027)
childsex            0.045           0.105          0.179           0.147                  0.180
(0.093)         (0.097)        (0.114)         (0.129)                (0.156)
fathwage -0.118           0.016 -0.251*          0.325* -0.173
(0.124)         (0.122)        (0.139)         (0.191)                (0.207)
mothwage -0.465** -0.097 -1.215*** -0.253 -0.337
(0.230)         (0.219)        (0.253)         (0.366)                (0.364)
edufath             0.059***        0.025          0.030*          0.045**                0.065***
(0.020)         (0.017)        (0.018)         (0.019)                (0.022)
edumoth             0.002           0.075          0.069*          0.064 -0.030
(0.045)         (0.046)        (0.041) (0.044)                (0.030)
agefath -0.041 -0.070          0.091* -0.001 -0.001
(0.044)         (0.051)        (0.051)         (0.057)                (0.073)
agefath2            0.000           0.001 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.001)                (0.001)
agemoth             0.015 0.043 -0.016 -0.111                  0.093
(0.051)         (0.057)        (0.059)         (0.075)                (0.085)
agemoth2 -0.000 -0.001          0.000           0.001 -0.001
(0.001)         (0.001)        (0.001)         (0.001)                (0.001)
lnrexpa             0.382*          0.080          0.286 -0.089                  0.995***
(0.223)         (0.547)        (0.688)         (0.678)                (0.354)
wage -0.345***       0.421*** -0.231 -0.453*** -0.413***
(0.002)         (0.001)        (0.001)         (0.002)                (0.001)
hhsize              0.071*** -0.012 -0.025 -0.017                  0.007
(0.022)         (0.026)        (0.028)         (0.027) (0.030)
rural               0.166           0.345* -0.048 -0.131 -0.033
(0.187)         (0.192)        (0.228)         (0.246)                (0.228)
north 0.426***        0.276* -0.090           0.434                  0.648*
(0.144)         (0.161)        (0.195)         (0.273)                (0.342)
centre -0.118 -0.379*** -0.327** -0.058 -0.219
(0.111)         (0.111)        (0.128)         (0.145)                (0.189)
residcons -0.322** -0.021*** -0.042***       0.324*** -0.237***
(0.001)         (0.001)        (0.004)         (0.012)                (0.004)
constant           0.142           3.673 -0.289           6.975 -7.707*
(2.205)         (5.229)        (6.783)         (6.922)                (3.986)
Log likelihood -8789 -5339 -2778 -4456 -6729
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table A13: Probit results of non-biological children (unrelated) by expenditure
quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
agechild -0.227*** -0.292*** -0.351*** -0.320*** -0.400***
(0.031)         (0.039)          (0.045)         (0.041)                (0.050)
childsex            0.263           0.159            0.533**         0.286                  1.071***
(0.210)         (0.228)          (0.225)         (0.227)                (0.225)
fathwage -0.084 -0.458            0.579*          0.134                  0.804**
(0.365)         (0.297)          (0.315)         (0.324)                (0.316)
mothwage -0.327           0.917            0.045 0.054*                 0.035
(0.575)         (0.759)          (0.039)         (0.030)                (0.026)
edufath             0.074* -0.001 -0.068           0.066                  0.018
(0.042)         (0.044)          (0.052)         (0.053)                (0.032)
edumoth             0.004           0.097 -0.013           0.006                  0.008
(0.352)         (0.070)          (0.049)         (0.062)                (0.072)
agefath             0.002 -0.104            0.000          0.000 -0.000
(0.062)         (0.080)          (0.000) (0.001)                (0.001)
agefath2 -0.000           0.001            0.068           0.071                  0.040
(0.001)         (0.001)          (0.055)         (0.071)                (0.073)
agemoth             0.071           0.115 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.060)         (0.086)          (0.001)         (0.001)                (0.001)
agemoth2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.676           1.073 -0.691**
(0.001)         (0.001)          (1.422)         (1.176)                (0.291)
lnrexpa             0.214           0.065            0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.475)         (1.226)          (0.002)         (0.003)                (0.002)
wage -0.320*** -0.453*** -0.338*** -0.182*** -0.475***
(0.001)         (0.003)          (0.043)         (0.060)                (0.049)
hhsize              0.025           0.006 -0.246 -0.511                  0.090
(0.033)         (0.042)          (0.418)         (0.425)                (0.320)
rural               0.044           0.281            0.526*          0.066                  0.422
(0.378)         (0.457)          (0.316)         (0.356)                (0.341)
north               0.249           0.468            0.562** -0.305                  0.260
(0.269)         (0.345)          (0.270)         (0.276) (0.262)
centre              0.386 -0.023 -0.000           0.000                  0.000
(0.283)         (0.264)          (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
residcons -0.237*** -0.172***         0.248*** -0.324*** -0.218***
(0.000)         (0.002)          (0.001)         (0.002)                (0.001)
constant -0.093           3.411 10.420 -7.847                 11.618***
(4.299)        (11.466)         (14.001)        (11.673)                (3.337)
Log likelihood -8189 -9747 -2015 -2321 -4775
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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